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Abstract
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) remain vulnerable through attack vectors that exist
within programmable logic controllers (PLC). PLC emulators used as honeypots can
provide insight into these vulnerabilities. Honeypots can sometimes deter attackers from
real devices and log activity. A variety of PLC emulators exist, but require manual
configuration to change their PLC profile. This limits their flexibility for deployment. An
automated process for configuring PLC emulators can open the door for emulation of
many types of PLCs.
This study investigates the feasibility of creating such a process. The research creates
an automated process for configuring the web protocols of a Koyo DirectLogic PLC. The
configuration process is a software program that collects information about the PLC and
creates a behavior profile. A generic web server then references that profile in order to
respond properly to requests. To measure the ability of the process, the resulting emulator
is evaluated based on response accuracy and timing accuracy. In addition, the
configuration time of the process itself is measured. For the accuracy measurements a
workload of 1000 GET requests are sent to the index.html page of the PLC, and then to
the emulator. These requests are sent at two rates: Slow and PLC Break. The emulator
responses are then compared to those of the PLC baseline.
Results show that the process completes in 9.8 seconds, on average. The resulting
emulator responds with 97.79% accuracy across all trials. It responds 1.3 times faster than
the real PLC at the Slow response rate, and 1.4 times faster at the PLC Break rate. Results
indicate that the automated process is able to create an emulator with an accuracy that is
comparable to a manually configured emulator. This supports the hypothesis that creating
an automated process for configuring a PLC emulator with a high level of accuracy is
feasible.
iv
I would like to dedicate this work to my family. They have equipped me with the ability to
succeed both in academia and beyond.
v
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Dr. Barry Mullins for his support and guidance through this
process. I would also like to thank Capt Robert Jaromin for his expertise on the subject.
Deanna R. Fink
vi
Table of Contents
Page
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
List of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Goals and Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Scope and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.5 Thesis Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II. Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Industrial Control Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.1 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.2 Programmable Logic Controllers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.3 Attack Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Honeypots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.2 High-Interaction Honeypots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.3 Low-Interaction Honeypots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Honeypot Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4.1 Current Honeypot Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4.2 Independent Gumstix Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.3 Honeyd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
vii
Page
III. Emulation Configuration Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2 Configuration Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.1 auto-wget.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.2 inputFinder.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2.3 parse pcap.py and config emulator.sh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3 Emulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3.1 webserver.py and variableFile.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
IV. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1 Problem Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1.2 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2 System Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.3 System Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.4 Workload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.4.1 Request Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.5 Performance Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.5.1 Response Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.5.2 Response Time Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.5.3 Configuration Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.6 System Parameters and Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.7 Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.8 Evaluation Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.9 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.10 Methodology Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
V. Results and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.1 Response Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.2 Timing Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.2.1 Slow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.2.2 PLC Break . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.2.3 Adding an Artificial Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.2.4 Comparison to Gumtstix MCE Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.3 Configuration Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
viii
Page
VI. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.1 Research Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.2.1 Adding Functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.2.2 Increasing Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.2.3 Accuracy Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Appendix A: Configuring the Emulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Appendix B: Non-deterministic Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Appendix C: Commands run by config emulator.sh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
ix
List of Figures
Figure Page
2.1 Structure of a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System [SJK13] . . . 6
2.2 Structure of the Digital Bond Honeynet [Dig11] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Gumstix Emulation Filter of Koyo DirectLOGIC 405 PLC [Jar13] . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Honeyd Architecture [PrH08] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1 Configuration Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2 Configuration Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3 auto-wget Script . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.4 Sending GET Requests to Each Page and Recording Responses in inputFinder . 23
3.5 Response Dictionary in variableFile.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.6 Locating SYN/ACK Packet with parse pcap.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.7 Locating Network Options in parse pcap.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.8 config emulator Script . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.9 Method for Responding to GET Requests Within webserver.py . . . . . . . . . 27
4.1 Emulation Configuration Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2 Successful Response Rate at Varying Frequencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3 Method for Comparing Packet Bytes. [Jar13] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.4 Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.1 Eight Response Packet Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.2 Format of the Ethernet II Header [Cis12] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.3 Difference in MAC Address Bytes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.4 Format of the IP and TCP Headers [Hus04] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.5 Comparison of content-type Phrase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.6 Device Response Times at the Slow Level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
x
Figure Page
5.7 Device Response Times at the PLC Break Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.8 Device Response Times at the PLC Break Level. All outliers for the PLC
response times have been removed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.9 Histogram of the Configuration Time of the ACE Across 25 Replications . . . 55
xi
List of Tables
Table Page
4.1 Request Frequency. This is the rate at which requests are sent to the device. . . 32
5.1 Response Accuracy of the ACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.2 Incorrect Bytes in the ACE Response Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.3 Summary of Device Response Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.4 Comparison of Response Times for the ACE With the Delay and Without the
Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.5 Comparison of Response Times for the ACE and the Gumstix MCE [Jar13] . . 54
B.1 Ethernet Header Fields [Jar13] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
B.2 IP Header Fields [Jar13] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
B.3 TCP Header Fields [Jar13] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
xii
List of Acronyms
Acronym Definition
ACE automatically-configured emulator
CPU central processing unit
CUT component under test
ECT emulation configuration tool
HMI human machine interface
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
ICS industrial control system
IED intelligent electronic device
MAC media access control
MCE manually-configured emulator
MSS maximum segment size
MTU maximum transmission unit
OUI organizationally unique identifier
PLC programmable logic controller
RTU remote terminal unit
SCADA supervisory control and data acquisition
SUT system under test
TTL time to live
VM virtual machine
xiii
TOWARD AUTOMATING WEB PROTOCOL CONFIGURATION FOR A
PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER EMULATOR
I. Introduction
1.1 Overview
Industrial control systems (ICSs) are a critical element of the nation’s infrastructure.
Ensuring that these systems are secure is important. industrial control systems (ICSs)
remain vulnerable to cyber-attacks, particularly due to unprotected programmable logic
controllers (PLCs). A PLC is a component of ICSs that controls many of the system’s
physical functions such as, “logic, sequencing timing, counting, and arithmetic in order to
control machines and processes”[Bol00]. A cyber-attack on a PLC can result in a
catastrophic failure of the system.
One way in which more can be learned about the vulnerabilities and exploits
associated with PLCs is through honeypot technology. Honeypots are “fake” versions of a
system intended to fool an attacker into thinking they are on an actual system. The
honeypots are then used to capture the attacker’s activity. Honeypots take two forms:
high-interaction and low-interaction. High-interaction honeypots are a real device, but
serve no purpose other than to distract attackers and log information [PrH08].
Low-interaction honeypots are emulators of the real system and have many benefits,
particularly in the case of PLC honeypots [PrH08]. They can be cost effective and readily
accessible to deploy than high-interaction honeypots. This research focuses on
low-interaction honeypots.
Researchers have used various methods to implement PLC honeypots. For example,
one project used two virtual machines and a real PLC. The first virtual machine logs the
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attack information, while the second is a low-level honeypot emulating a PLC. The
honeypot attaches to a real PLC of the same type that the honeypot is emulating [Dig11].
Another project used Honeyd, a program that specializes in creating large networks of
honeypots [Pot05]. It includes a PLC package that offers a minimally functional emulator
[Hon12].
A more recent independent research project created an emulator of a single PLC
[Jar13]. The project focused on creating an emulator that was as accurate as possible. The
emulator that the project created was a manually-coded emulator of a Koyo DirectLogic
PLC [Koy13] [Jar13]. Because the emulator was configured manually, the process was
time consuming. Having the ability to automatically configure the emulator to act like an
arbitrary PLC device would create a more flexible tool for studying the PLC
vulnerabilities.
1.2 Goals and Hypothesis
This research theorizes that an emulator of a PLC can be created through an
automated process. The goal of this research is to create an emulator of the web protocols
of a PLC using an automated configuration process. The resulting
automatically-configured emulator (ACE) should respond with a goal of 100% accuracy to
common requests. Accuracy is based on how closely the ACE responses match those of
the PLC. Potentially, with continued research, a threshold level that consistently deceives
the attackers can be achieved. This experiment seeks to answer the question: Can the
process of configuring a PLC emulator be automated?
Automating this process lays a foundation for further honeypot research. With further
production, it may potentially allow researchers to quickly create emulators of multiple
honeypots. This could make it easier to deploy entire networks of honeypots into real
industrial networks, which could then be used to log activity in the system. Another
potential use is in academic settings. In order to educate people on the PLCs
2
vulnerabilities. Emulators can easily be created for entire classrooms. Automating the
process of configuring PLC web protocols is one step towards having complete emulators
of various types of PLC that are flexible and quickly created.
1.3 Scope and Limitations
The emulation target for this research are the HTTP protocols of a Koyo DirectLogic
405 PLC. The protocols are limited to HTTP, due to the open knowledge of their
implementation. In addition the ACE is tested only against the Koyo DirectLogic PLC.
This research chose to focus on this PLC due to its low cost, availability of
documentation, presence of known exploits, and its previous use in other research [Jar13].
That project created a manually-configured emulator of the Koyo DirectLogic PLC. The
emulator included the HAP, Modbus, and HTTP protocols of the PLC. To emulate the
HTTP protocols, the previous research used a Python-based HTTP web server. Because of
the availability of libraries and modules, the same Python web server was chosen for this
research. Emulating the same PLC with similar emulation software allows for some
comparison of an automatically-configured emulator to a manually-configured emulator.
Further details of the previous project are included in Section 2.4.2.
1.4 Approach
To create the configuration process, a set of rules and settings are compiled. These
settings include network interface options and web server response behavior. During the
configuration process, the configuration tool changes the values of settings based on
information it gathers in real time from the PLC. The result of the process is an ACE. The
usefulness of the configuration process is based on the accuracy of the emulator and the
time required to configure the emulator. Accuracy is measured by two metrics, using a
real PLC as a baseline. These levels are response accuracy and response time.
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1.5 Thesis Overview
Chapter 2 gives background information on industrial control systems, honeypots, and
related research. Chapter 3 describes the tools created for this study and how they are used
to create an automatically-configured emulator. The methodology used for this research is
provided in Chapter 4. Next, Chapter 5 discusses the results of the experiments. Finally,
Chapter 6 covers the research conclusions of this study and offers possible avenues for
future research.
4
II. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces current research in industrial control systems (ICSs) and the
application of honeypots to ICS. Section 2.2 gives an overview of ICS, supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, and their associated vulnerabilities.
Section 2.3 introduces honeypots and explores various approaches available to implement
them. Section 2.4 outlines current research in ICS honeypots and identifies areas for
improvement. Finally, Section 2.5 summarizes the chapter.
2.2 Industrial Control Systems
ICSs control much of the machinery in the nation’s manufacturing and critical
infrastructure. This includes electrical systems, water, gas, transportation, and many other
industries [SJK13]. ICSs include multiple types of control systems. This research is
focused particularly on SCADA systems. Multiple devices make up industrial control
systems: the Control Server (called the master terminal unit in SCADA systems), the
remote terminal unit (RTU), intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), the Data Historian, the
Input/Output Server, the human machine interface (HMI) and programmable logic
controllers (PLCs) [SJK13]. PLCs are most relevant to this research.
2.2.1 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems.
One distinct characteristic of SCADA systems is their geographical disbursement
[SFS13]. Figure 2.1 illustrates the general structure for a SCADA system. In a SCADA
system, operators are able to perform real-time monitoring and control of industrial
automation systems and industrial processes from remote locations. Some of the
capabilities a SCADA system provides are:
• Access of sensor measurements of industrial processes
5
• Detect and correct process errors
• Measure trends over time
• Control geographically dispersed processes with a small, less specialized staff
Figure 2.1: Structure of a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System [SJK13]
One element of a SCADA system is the HMI, which allows operators to connect to
field devices and configure them. As shown in Figure 2.1 the HMI connects to field
devices through telephone and power lines, radio, microwaves, cellular communications
and satellite. In a SCADA system, these field devices can be an RTU, IED, or PLC. The
PLC/IED/RTU contains logic that monitors sensors and instructs machinery on what
actions to take. RTUs are field devices that often communicate information to the SCADA
system through wireless communications [SJK13]. Occasionally the term RTU and PLC
are used interchangeably, but this research considers them separate devices. An IED is a
“‘smart’ sensor/actuator[s] containing the intelligence required to acquire data,
communicate to other devices, and perform local processing and control” [SJK13]. PLCs
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are logic-based computers that perform a variety of controls. Further discussion of PLC
functionality is described in Section 2.2.2.
Proper functioning of the PLC/IED/RTU requires low-latency communication
between sensors, the Master Terminal Unit (MTU), and other PLCs [SJK13]. Any
malfunction in these devices can result in downtime, evaluation, repair and possible
destruction of the entire system. PLCs are vulnerable pieces of SCADA systems [Lev11].
This is a problem because PLCs control the major functions of an ICS.
Infrastructure and manufacturing began using industrial control systems before the era
of Internet connectivity. First generation ICS architecture designs did not include
interconnection with inter-networked computer systems. If remote connectivity was
required, it was primarily through a non-persistent dial-up telephone connection. As the
Internet grew in popularity, computer networking expanded using Local Area Networks
(LAN) and Wide Area Networks (WAN). Industrial sectors began to recognize the
potential benefits of using this type of networking for their control systems. The use of
these systems improved efficiencies and reduced the costs for ICS. This resulted in the
creation of SCADA systems [Lev11]. Because operators are now connecting to PLCs
through a TCP/IP network connection, PLCs may be exposed to the Internet and
susceptible to network-based intrusions.
2.2.2 Programmable Logic Controllers.
PLCs consist of four parts: an input/output device, central processing unit (CPU), a
programming device, and a power supply [Roh96]. The purpose of a PLC is to use
“programmable memory to store instructions and to implement functions such as logic,
sequencing timing, counting, and arithmetic in order to control machines and processes”
[Bol00]. PLCs have become more popular due to their many advantages. Some of these
advantages include cost effectiveness, flexibility, computational abilities, troubleshooting
aids, and component reliability [Jac08].
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The PLC uses ladder logic to control and monitor systems. Operators can configure
the ladder logic and other functions via the HMI. They can also connect the HMI to the
PLC in various ways, including “a dedicated platform in the control center, a laptop on a
wireless LAN, or a browser on any system connected to the Internet” [SJK13]. If an
attacker is able to connect to a PLC through any of these avenues, he/she can read and
potentially alter the logic program. Then the PLC would react incorrectly to sensor
information, thus disrupting the process under control and potentially causing physical
damage to equipment.
For example, in 2010 a computer worm called Stuxnet was discovered that targets
Siemens PLCs. It had infiltrated an Iranian uranium plant by looking for Internet-facing
computers using the Windows operating system that were also connected to ICS networks.
Once the worm found the computers that fit the profile, it used them to gain access to
PLCs. Attackers were able to reprogram PLCs on the Iranian ICS so that motors would
spin at speeds not in line with their specifications. Moreover, the attackers installed a
rootkit that prevented the true state of the motors from being reported to an operator
[FMC11]. The combination of these two attacks caused physical damage that resulted in a
great financial loss for the Iranian government.
Attacks like this on a nation’s critical infrastructure could cause financial damage and
potentially harm human life. One possible approach to learn how these types of
cyber-attacks are executed, their associated exploitable vulnerabilities, and how to defend
against them is through honeypots, which Section 2.3 describes.
2.2.3 Attack Vectors.
PLCs are a target for vulnerabilities in SCADA systems. Connectivity to TCP/IP
networks increases their exposure [Cpn11]. As of 2007, the most common attack vector is
through corporate networks and the Internet [BLK07]. SCADA systems are often
connected directly to corporate WANs. Communication between SCADA devices and
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other computers within the corporate network may go unchecked. Because of this, a
compromised computer sitting inside a corporate WAN bypasses all measures to protect
SCADA systems, and becomes an open door to the PLCs.
Some SCADA systems are actually connected directly to the Internet, which opens
them up to a wide array of attackers. This includes script kiddies (unskilled hackers) who
may not intentionally direct sophisticated attacks at SCADA systems, but do have the
ability to cause damage nonetheless [KLK09]. Additional attack vectors including dial-up
modems, wireless systems, and virtual private networks add to the complexity of entry
points, and make SCADA security a more difficult issue to address [BLK07]. The next
section describes one potential method in which researchers can begin to create more
efficient security solutions for SCADA systems.
2.3 Honeypots
2.3.1 Overview.
In general, a honeypot is a tool that can be used to log auditable information and often
serves as a decoy that draws in attackers away from real target systems. Two basic types
of honeypots exist, and each has their own merits. The first type, the high-interaction
honeypot, is an actual duplicate device of the same type of system that the honeypot is
meant to protect [PrH08]. The second type, which is discussed in greater detail and is the
focus of this research effort, is a low-interaction honeypot. This type of honeypot consists
of different hardware and software in order to emulate the device that the honeypot is
protecting [PrH08].
2.3.2 High-Interaction Honeypots.
A high-interaction honeypot is useful in that it is able to function exactly as the device
in question, because it employs the same hardware and software. An attacker interacting
with a high-interaction honeypot should have no reason to question that it is any different
from the actual targeted system.
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Because high-interaction honeypots are configured exactly as real systems on the
network, they are also vulnerable to the same attacks. Moreover, duplicate real devices are
typically more expensive and difficult to maintain than other options. In addition, many
companies are unwilling to share information about their systems [DHS13], because much
of it is proprietary [ByL04]. The next section describes an alternative honeypot solution
for SCADA research.
2.3.3 Low-Interaction Honeypots.
Low-interaction honeypots, on the other hand, are an emulation of the device. The
term emulation generally means “using some device or program in place of a different one
to achieve the same effect as using the original” [Sla03]. Emulation of software and
applications can be difficult due to their sometimes proprietary nature [HoW05].
Therefore, emulators may only mimic functionality with either entirely new systems, or
only pieces of the original system [Jul91]. Although emulators often provide only a subset
of services, when used as honeypots, they only need to provide enough interaction that an
attacker or tool accepts the emulator as the real device [PrH08].
The main purpose of a low-interaction honeypot is to serve as a facade of interaction,
and in most cases attackers can do little to no harm to them. In addition, low-interaction
honeypot solutions are often less expensive [PrH08], and more practical to operate and
configure than the devices they are designed to represent. Also, because there is no real
operating system, it is less likely that a low-interaction honeypot can be used to attack
other systems within the network [Spi03].
Despite their many advantages, low-interaction honeypots are much more difficult to
disguise. Because they are not the actual device, designers must incorporate features and
customize them to behave as closely as possible to the devices they are intended to mimic.
These steps include simulating network protocols, spoofing device specifications, and
more in depth, simulating the way that it would interact with other devices within its
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network [PrH08]. The next section discusses ways of implementing some of these
characteristics, and how each implementation could affect the ability to add additional
features.
2.4 Honeypot Research
2.4.1 Current Honeypot Activities.
A variety of projects exist that demonstrate a range of efforts to utilize honeypot
technology in industrial control systems. Interestingly, in some way, each of them is
deficient and leaves room for improving honeypot technology. The first project, called the
SCADA HoneyNet Project, attempted to accomplish many of the same goals that this
research effort outlines. The developers planned to use Honeyd (discussed in more detail
in Section 2.4.3) to emulate multiple PLCs. The developers were able to simulate a small
set of functionality, but development of the SCADA HoneyNet project stopped in 2005
[PoF05].
Another project, created by Digital Bond in 2008, took a different path. The project
incorporated many of the ideas in the SCADA HoneyNet project, and used two virtual
machines. The first virtual machine is a Honeywall VM that logs traffic information, while
the second is a low-level honeypot emulating a Modicon Quantum PLC [Dig11]. As
shown in Figure 2.2, the Honeywall logs and filters traffic as it comes in from the Internet.
The emulator virtual machine runs Honeyd to emulate the PLC services. Digital Bond
also extended the project to allow a real PLC to be attached to the system. In this case, the
PLC replaces the emulator VM [Dig11]. This project is one of the most developed so far,
but requires many pieces of hardware in order to operate it.
In 2011, a student at Iowa State created a Honeynet in an attempt to log attack
information on PLCs [Wad11]. The study utilized the Digital Bond Design. The Honeynet
was deployed on a network for approximately one month and monitored attacks. The
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Figure 2.2: Structure of the Digital Bond Honeynet [Dig11]
study did not result in any logged attacks. However, two critical pieces of the experiment
may mean that the network was not an accurate representation of a real PLC network.
First, the Honeynet was on the 129.186.255.255 subnet, which is identifiable as an Iowa
State domain from a Whois lookup. If an outsider were to see this, it would provide strong
evidence that the honeypot was not within a real industrial network. Second, the emulated
PLC was a Schneider Quantum Modicon which was the default configuration for the
Digital Bond honeypot. If an attacker visiting the network knew about the Digital Bond
experiment, seeing that the honeypot was a Modicon PLC might have deterred the attacker
from exploiting the device.
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Creating a PLC honeypot is difficult. Contributing to the difficulty is the large number
of PLC brands, models, and protocols that exist which are often proprietary. No one has
yet perfected a process, but research continues to combine and build upon techniques,
making fully functioning PLC honeypots more feasible. The next section outlines another
project that uses single board computers to implement a honeypot.
2.4.2 Independent Gumstix Research.
A researcher at the Air Force Institute of Technology developed a
manually-configured emulator (MCE) to resemble the behavior of a Koyo DirectLOGIC
405 PLC on a single board computer called a Gumstix [Gum12]. The researcher modified
the way in which the device (running Linux) accepts and responds to network queries
[Jar13].
When a query arrives at the device, it must go through a series of filters so the device
will be able to run the correct services and respond appropriately. Here, appropriately
means that the device will respond in the same way that the Koyo PLC is expected to
respond.
As shown in Figure 2.3, in the boxes labeled rules, the packets are filtered through IP
Tables rules to determine how the packet should be handled. The filter rejects any TCP
packet that arrives on a port other than port 80 or 502. Any incoming packets that appear
to be from a port scanner are dropped and a custom response packet is formed. When
generating a response, the firewall must insert information that the port scanner (e.g.,
Nmap) is expecting. The firewall makes a decision based on the technique Nmap uses to
interrogate the device during the scanning process [Nma12]. In this case, the packet will
contain information to make the Gumstix device look like a Koyo PLC. The response
packet then moves through the kernel and out through the outgoing IP Tables rules [Jar13].
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Figure 2.3: Gumstix Emulation Filter of Koyo DirectLOGIC 405 PLC [Jar13]
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If the query is a TCP packet sent to port 80 or 502, or a UDP packet sent to port
28784, then the kernel routes the packet to its corresponding, user-space process [Jar13].
To move the packets from kernel-space to user-space, the emulator uses NFQUEUE. This
is a kernel module that allows the packets to be sent to user-space processes through
queues. The specifications for the Koyo PLC determine the routing for accepted packets
[Jar13].
This process was demonstrated to work well, in that the Gumstix computer reacts to
various queries in the same manner that the Koyo PLC would. The Gumstix emulator is
currently limited to behave like a single PLC. It is not able to emulate other manufacturers
or models of PLCs, nor is it able to emulate more than a single instance of a PLC. The
former functionality is achievable, but currently this would require the developer to
hardcode the configuration for all of the PLC’s interactive query/response behavior. This
research incorporates parts of the Gumstix MCE design into the creation of an ACE.
2.4.3 Honeyd.
In 2003, Niels Provos began a project called Honeyd. The project was an effort to
create a framework for the development of low-interaction honeypots, with a focus on
emulating multiple honeypots on a single computer [Hon12]. In contrast to the Gumstix
architecture, Honeyd runs with root privileges, eliminating the transition from the kernel
to user mode and back to the kernel [PrH08]. In addition, Honeyd has a feature that allows
it to route traffic to a range of IP addresses, as specified by the developer [PrH08].
Figure 2.4 illustrates how network traffic flows directly to Honeyd. If the developer
prefers to emulate multiple devices, then he can allocate a set of IP addresses to Honeyd
[PrH08]. Honeyd will then route traffic to the appropriate honeypot. Additionally, the
developer has the flexibility to configure each honeypot to emulate a variety of devices.
When the packet arrives at the dispatcher, Honeyd performs a series of checks, similar to
the Gumstix architecture, that allows Honeyd to respond to the query properly and
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perform the correct services. Honeyd refers to the specifications of how a honeypot should
respond as the personality of the honeypot. After Honeyd executes the correct services,
any packet that requires a response, will go through the routing process and then to the
personality engine. The personality engine then modifies the response to fit the personality
of the honeypot that received the query [PrH08].
Figure 2.4: Honeyd Architecture [PrH08]
The range of functionality that Honeyd offers makes it an attractive option for
emulating multiple PLCs, but it has drawbacks that the Gumstix architecture does not.
First, Honeyd’s popularity opens it to potential fingerprinting. Oberheide and Kair
describe two methods to detect Honeyd [ObK06]. The first method is through default
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response messages. If these messages were left as the default, they provide an effective
method to determine they are interacting with a honeypot. Second, there is an error in the
way that Honeyd handles fragmented packets. When fragmented packets are sent to
Honeyd, the protocol is considered incorrect and Honeyd will improperly respond to the
packets with a SYN/ACK [ObK06]. Both of these issues can be corrected, but are
considered added complexity when considering Honeyd for research.
2.5 Summary
This chapter discusses SCADA systems and why vulnerabilities exist in them. It, also,
describes honeypots which could be used to learn more about how these vulnerabilities are
being exploited. The chapter then provides an overview of various methods researchers
used to develop honeypots for Industrial Control Systems.
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III. Emulation Configuration Tool
This chapter describes the software that allows for the creation of a PLC web interface
emulator. The emulation configuration tool (ECT) includes two pieces: the configuration
process and the automatically-configured emulator (ACE). The configuration process
works by using a set of configuration programs to gather information and create a profile.
The emulator uses that information to run a web server. As shown in Figure 3.1 the PLC
connects directly to the configuration machine through an Ethernet cable in order to
communicate.
Figure 3.1: Configuration Setup
3.1 Design
The design of the ECT includes several considerations: speed, minimal user
interaction, and accuracy. The purpose of the ECT is to automate the configuration
process for PLC honeypots. Therefore, the ECT must be reasonably fast and require little
human interaction, while maintaining an acceptable level of accuracy.
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Based on the expected applications of this process, a maximum configuration time of
five minutes is the threshold for this research. For instance, this tool could be used in an
educational environment. Five minutes per emulator would be a reasonable time frame to
set up a lab environment. Because of the speed and cost, each student could have an
emulator to interact with. If the ECT is used for deploying emulators in an industrial
environment, five minutes is also acceptable. It is expected that only a few PLCs would
need to be created for use as honeypots within a single network. In addition the emulators
would likely need to be created only once. A configuration time of five minutes would not
keep operators from other work for an unacceptable amount of time.
In addition to speed, minimal user interaction is an important factor in the design of
the ECT. The ECT requires few instances in which a human must interact and those user
interactions would need little specialized skill. Whether this tool is used in an educational
environment or being deployed in an industrial network, the individual setting up the
emulator does not need to be an expert in PLC design and protocols. The commands
needed to run the emulator should only require general technical knowledge. The ideal
scenario for this research is a single script to run the entire process.
Finally, the ECT must be accurate. In order to create a profile for the responses of the
PLC, the ECT collects information from three vectors: (1) web page collection, (2)
mirroring of Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) response headers, and (3) configuration
of network settings through pcap parsing. The combination of these methods increases the
accuracy across multiple levels.
3.2 Configuration Process
To gather the necessary information, the configuration tool runs a variety of scripts
which send and receive web traffic. The configuration process utilizes four creation files
which probe the PLC and create the profile. These files are auto-wget.py, inputFinder.py,
parse pcap.py, and config emulator.sh. A description of the configuration steps is shown
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in Figure 3.2. The steps of this process are outlined below. In parentheses, following each
step, is the name of any scripts or files associated with that step.
1. Gather all of the web pages available on the interface. This step uses a third party
tool called wget which harvests all of the pages and then saves them in a local
directory. (auto-wget.py)
2. Send HTTP GET request to each page in the directory from step one. In addition,
save response headers to a dictionary. (inputFinder.py, variableFile.py)
3. Record traffic from step two using tcpdump and save traffic capture to a pcap file.
4. Use the pcap file to gather network configuration information (parse pcap.py)
5. Echo network configuration values to associated files within the Linux file system.
(config emulator.sh)
3.2.1 auto-wget.py.
This file runs the wget utility and the inputFinder.py program which is outlined in
Figure 3.3. When auto-wget.py is executed, the operator must input the IP address of the
PLC and any login credentials required to access pages in the web interface. It then runs
the wget command wget -r -l 15 -e [optional credentials]
robots=off [IP address]. The results of the wget command are a collection of
all of the accessible pages in the web interface. Those pages are then placed in a folder.
The label for this folder is the IP address of the PLC. In addition, auto-wget.py initializes
the inputFinder.py program.
Before running auto-wget.py the user must start tcpdump using the command $sudo
tcpdump -i eth0 -w settings.pcap. This records the TCP handshake packets
that contain network settings required to configure the emulator VM. Once auto-wget.py
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Figure 3.2: Configuration Process
has completed execution, the tcpdump script is ended by the user. Further discussion of
how settings.pcap is used is discussed in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.2 inputFinder.py.
For the web server to properly handle requests for pages, it has to know how the PLC
handles those requests. These requests include the headers of the response packets. The
file that gathers this information is inputFinder.py. This program records responses from
GET requests. As shown in Figure 3.4, a request is sent to the web page. The program
iterates through each section of the response header. It builds a string from these sections.
To send the requests it uses httplib, a built-in Python library. The HTTPConnect module
allows the program to send requests to the PLC, record the responses, and retrieve header
information.
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Figure 3.3: auto-wget Script
The headers from the responses are stored in a Python dictionary along with their
associated web page. This dictionary is stored in the file variableFile.py which is
described in Section 3.3.1. The web server portion of the emulator uses this dictionary to
formulate its own responses. The key in the response dictionary is the file name of the
web page. The value is the response header string that corresponds to the web page.
Figure 3.5 shows a section of the response dictionary.
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Figure 3.4: Sending GET Requests to Each Page and Recording Responses in inputFinder
Figure 3.5: Response Dictionary in variableFile.py
3.2.3 parse pcap.py and config emulator.sh.
The parse pcap.py script, combined with the config emulator.py program,
accomplishes the next step of configuration. This script collects information from the
settings.pcap file created during the interaction between the PLC and the auto-wget.py
23
script. Figure 3.6 shows that an initial dictionary is created containing the network settings
to be changed. This includes the maximum transmission unit (MTU), TCP Window
Scaling, TCP Selective Acknowledgment, TCP Timestamp, and time to live (TTL).
Figure 3.6: Locating SYN/ACK Packet with parse pcap.py
The parse pcap.py uses a Python library called dpkt to parse the pcap file. It
specifically looks for a packet from the PLC with both the SYN and ACK flags set. This
packet contains information about the network configuration of the PLC.
As Figure 3.7 shows, parse pcap.py uses dpkt, again, to search for the options listed
above and the values associated with them. The parse pcap.py program then runs the
config emulator.sh bash script, with the network options as arguments to the script.
The config emulator.sh script echoes the values to the appropriate files. Figure 3.8
shows that the current options being changed are in the ipv4 folder within Linux. Note
that the ICMP Rate Limit is also a value being changed. The dpkt library does not have
the functionality to retrieve this value. For this study, the rate limit is turned off. Pilot
studies show that this value is turned off in other PLCs, so this is considered acceptable. A
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Figure 3.7: Locating Network Options in parse pcap.py
full list of the values changed by config emulator.sh and their descriptions is included in
Appendix C.
Figure 3.8: config emulator Script
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3.3 Emulator
Once the creation programs have completed, the emulator is ready to be started. The
emulator is made up of a python web server, the web page files, and a file that contains
dictionaries for the web server to refer to when formulating a response. The web sever is
contained in the file webserver.py. The web page files are those gathered in the
inputFinder program. Finally, the file that holds the response dictionary is variableFile.py.
3.3.1 webserver.py and variableFile.py.
The emulator uses a Python-based HTTP server to serve responses to the client
[Pyt14]. This server is contained in webserver.py. The web server accepts GET requests
from a client and serves responses based on the values within variableFile.py. The
variableFile.py file contains a response dictionary that holds a mapping of the page names
to the response given by the PLC when a GET request is sent to that page. Figure 3.9
shows the section of the web server code that handles GET requests. The GET request
handler uses the file name as the key to search for the appropriate header in the response
dictionary in variableFile.py. The header value that is returned is combined with the
contents of the web page file. The resulting string is placed in a packet and sent as the
response.
In pilot studies, a difference in response times between the PLC and the ACE was
discovered. The average delay was 1.5 ms. Therefore, a static artificial delay of 1.5 ms is
added to the request handler of the ACE web server for each response. This added delay is
not as accurate as it could be. A more accurate delay would potentially be variable, to
match the variability in the PLC responses. In addition the delay could also be based on
the times of the responses gathered during the configuration process. This would allow for
a delay that is tailored to the network speeds and the specific PLC. The response accuracy
of the ACE with the delay is analyzed in addition to the response accuracy without the
delay.
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Figure 3.9: Method for Responding to GET Requests Within webserver.py
3.4 Summary
The ECT combines speed, minimal interaction, extensibility and accuracy to create a
useful configuration tool. It uses information gathered from wget, behavior of responses to
GET requests, and system configuration options gathered from packet headers. This
process creates a profile that fits the behavior of the PLC. In addition, more rules could be
added if analysis shows that those rules would increase the capabilities of the ECT or the
accuracy of the ACE.
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IV. Methodology
4.1 Problem Definition
4.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis.
The goal of this research is to create a process for automatically configuring a PLC
emulator. Some PLC emulators in existence are manually configured, which is a lengthy
and specialized process. In addition, the resulting emulator is configured to a single type
of PLC. An automated process would decrease the configuration time and allow for the
configuration of an emulator that is able to mimic any type of PLC. In addition, although
the process would be consistent over multiple iterations, the lack of human involvement
can lead to a possible loss of accuracy.
It is hypothesized that an PLC emulator can be created through an automated process.
Because of the large number of PLC types and the variety of protocols and
implementations PLCs use, this research is focused on automating the process for
configuring the emulator at the web-protocol level. This includes emulating open
protocols used to control PLCs through a web interface. How well the process works is
determined by the accuracy of the emulator and the efficiency of the process. Questions
that this research addresses include:
• Can the process of configuring a PLC emulator be automated?
• Can the process be a step towards creating emulators using various types of PLC
devices?
4.1.2 Approach.
To create a PLC emulator automatically, the configuration tool creates a profile by
interacting with the PLC and collecting information about its behavior. This behavior
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includes the way in which the PLC responds to HTTP GET requests, and the network
configuration of the PLC. The details of this process are outlined in Chapter 3.
Because many of the protocols associated with PLCs are proprietary, this research
focuses only on the open TCP/IP protocols. Specifically the research emulates a web
server that accepts traffic on port 80. In order to create a more complete emulation of a
PLC, all protocols would need to be emulated. Emulating the TCP/IP protocols is a first
step toward a full emulator.
4.2 System Boundaries
The system under test (SUT), shown in Figure 4.1, is the ECT. The components of the
system are the configuration process and the resulting automatically-configured
emulator (ACE). The configuration process is the component under test (CUT). The
workload into the system are GET requests sent to the ACE. The ACE uses the response
accuracy and response time metrics to evaluate its performance. The configuration process
is evaluated based on configuration time.
4.3 System Services
The service ECT provides is the creation of a PLC emulator. There are three possible
outcomes for this service: creation of an accurate emulator, creation of an inaccurate
emulator, and no creation of an emulator. When the tool succeeds, an emulator is created
that meets the threshold for acceptable accuracy. The measurements for accuracy are
described in Section 4.5. If an emulator is created, but does not meet those standards, it is
considered a failure. This outcome can occur either because outside factors affected the
ability of the configuration process to complete successfully, or because the algorithm for
creating the emulator is flawed. If no emulator is created, this is also a failure. This could
occur if the ECT does not include enough information to create a functional emulator. It
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Figure 4.1: Emulation Configuration Tool
may also fail if the computing factors, such as speed, CPU, hard drive and memory, do not
allow the ECT to complete execution.
4.4 Workload
The workload delivered to the system is HTTP GET requests sent to the device. For
this research, this is a request to the index.html page of the PLC web server. This page is
chosen for its size and complexity. The tool used to generate this workload is a script
called htmlget mt. It is a previously validated custom tool used in the Gumstix research
[Jar13]. The program works by sending GET requests to the index.html of the device.
Each request is sent on a different port. This feature allows packet streams to be separated
for analysis.
The workload generator sends 200 GET requests to the page during each experiment.
A set of 200 requests is selected because the htmlget mt program produces a segmentation
fault around 300 requests; therefore, a set of 200 requests is chosen to consistently send
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successful requests to the devices. Experiments are repeated 5 times for each combination
of workload and system factors. This means that a total of 1000 requests are sent for each
experiment, which allows for a small confidence interval for the mean.
Before any trials are run, the workload virtual machine is brought to a point in which
the CPU usage is at a steady state, and there is no network usage. Between each trial, the
Linux System Monitor program is used to determine a time in which the CPU usage has
leveled out again and network usage has returned to zero. In addition, a wait time of one
minute is placed between each experimental trial. This wait time ensures that the CPU
usage and network activity are at a steady state.
4.4.1 Request Frequency.
The request frequency is the rate at which requests are sent to the CUT. Any aspect in
which the ACE behavior diverges from that of the real device is an opportunity for
fingerprinting. Therefore, the frequency is varied to determine response accuracy of the
ACE at different levels.
In this research, there are two levels for the request frequency. The first is the PLC
Break; it is the level at which the PLC can no longer send responses fast enough. The
second level is a slow frequency at which both devices are able to easily handle requests.
A breaking point for the PLC was established in the MCE Gumstix study [Jar13]. Due to
changes in the experiment environment, these breaking points were reevaluated for this
study.
To find the breaking point of the PLC, requests were sent to the PLC at different
frequencies until the PLC cannot respond to the requests. The workload generator,
htmlget mt, places a built-in, changeable delay between requests. In pilot studies, requests
were sent with varying delays. Using a binary search method, a range of delays were
determined to be near the PLC breaking point. This range was found to be 38 milliseconds
(26.32 requests/second) to 45 milliseconds (22.22 requests/second).
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To determine the delay used as the PLC Break level for this experiment, requests are
sent at set increments. The point at which the PLC responds to at least 99% of the requests
is considered the PLC Break level. This means that the PLC is just beginning to fail to
respond to requests. For every trial, 200 requests are sent to the device, and trials are
repeated five times for each frequency. First, the delay is increased from 38 milliseconds
to 45 milliseconds in increments of one millisecond. At a delay of 42 milliseconds, the
average response success is 94.7%. To narrow in on a more accurate breaking point, sets
of requests are sent at 42.5, 43.5, and 44.5 milliseconds. At a delay of 44.5 seconds (22.47
requests/second), the PLC successfully responds to an average of 99.4% of the requests.
This is the PLC Break level. Figure 4.2 shows the percentages of successful responses at
each level. The figure shows the response percentages for each trial. The line represents
the average response percentage for each frequency. The resulting breaking point is shown
in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Request Frequency. This is the rate at which requests are sent to the device.
Frequency Label Frequency (requests/second)
Slow 10
PLC Break 22.47
4.5 Performance Metrics
To measure the performance of the configuration tool, the system is evaluated in terms
of both the configuration process and the final ACE. The metric for the process is the time
it takes to create the emulator. The time it takes to create the ACE is a combined execution
time of the configuration scripts. The time for the first script begins with the execution of
the wget command in the auto-wget.py script, and ends when the inputFinder.py ends
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Figure 4.2: Successful Response Rate at Varying Frequencies.
execution. The time of the second script starts when parse pcap.py opens the pcap file for
reading. The second time ends when the config emulator.sh script completes execution. If
the configurator exits without creating an emulator, the time that the process exited is
noted, but marked as a failure.
The ECT is evaluated, both on the performance of the configuration process, and the
accuracy of the resulting emulator. Emulator accuracy is measured in terms of packet
response time accuracy and the response accuracy. To maintain consistency in evaluation
techniques, these metrics are based on those used in preceding research [Jar13].
To evaluate the response accuracy and the response time accuracy metrics, a set of
GET requests are first sent to the index.html page of the real PLC at both the Slow and
PLC Break frequencies. The responses to these GET requests serve as a baseline for
measuring the performance of the ACE. Next, the same requests are sent to the emulator
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at both frequencies. A set of 200 requests are sent in each trial. Those trials are repeated
five times for a total of 1000 requests to each device. Trials are performed at least 60
seconds apart to ensure no residual network traffic or CPU usage affects the next trial. In
addition, the network traffic and CPU usage are monitored in Linux’s System Monitor
program. Trials are not run until the CPU usage has returned to the same level as it was
before any trials are run and no network activity is present.
4.5.1 Response Accuracy.
Response accuracy is based on how similar the ACE’s response is to that of the real
PLC. This is measured in the number of bytes in the emulator’s response that are the same
as those in the response of the real PLC.
Using Wireshark, the traffic of each conversation is recorded into two separate pcap
files. The first pcap file is a recording of the response traffic from the PLC to the workload
generator. The second pcap file is a recording of the response traffic from the ACE to the
workload generator. A program called pcap accuracy parse is used to compare the pcap
files. This program was created and validated in the Gumstix MCE research [Jar13]. The
pcap files are compared by separating the traffic into packet types. All response packets of
one type from the emulator traffic are compared to the corresponding packets from the
PLC traffic. This is done by comparing the packet bytes. For this research, the packets are
separated into eight packet types. This is because the Koyo PLC responds to the
index.html page in eight packets. This is based on the size of the page and the maximum
segment size (MSS) used by the Koyo PLC. In future research, experiments may need to
use a different number of packets to recreate an accurate comparison. A visualization of
this process is shown in Figure 4.3 [Jar13]. Certain packet bytes will always be different
(e.g., sequence number), and are not included in the comparison. These bytes are
considered non-deterministic.
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Figure 4.3: Method for Comparing Packet Bytes. [Jar13]
4.5.2 Response Time Accuracy.
The second part of accuracy measurement is response time accuracy. For this
experiment, response time “starts with the first packet of the TCP handshake [from the
workload generator to the emulator], and concludes with the final TCP ACK packet from
the [emulator]” [Jar13]. As with the response byte accuracy measurement, a baseline for
an expected average response time is created by sending requests to the PLC. A program
called web time parse is used to find the response time for each request. This program is
also created and validated in the Gumstix MCE research [Jar13]. When the program sends
requests to the device, it sends each request on a different outgoing port. The program is
written in C, and uses the sockaddr in structure for port handling. Because the workload
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generator sent each request on a different port, web time parse is able to separate each
stream based on the destination port number of the response packets. It then calculates the
difference in time between the start of one stream and the start of the next stream. The
response times from all 1000 requests are averaged. This is the average response time for
the device. The average response time of the ACE is compared to the average time of the
PLC.
4.5.3 Configuration Time.
The configuration time is defined as the total execution time of the configuration
scripts. Because of the way the scripts are run, this time is calculated from the sum of the
first script’s run time and that of the second script. To calculate the runtime of each script
the program uses Python’s built in time module. For each script, a timer begins before the
execution of any functions or calculations. The timer stops when no more calculations are
running. For some scripts, user input is required at the start of the program. The timer
starts after all user input is accepted. This is because that time is dependent on the user,
rather than the efficiency of the code. In addition, no configuration functionality begins
until all user input has been accepted.
The configuration time is measured for 25 separate instances. A sample of 25 is based
on the Central Limit Theorem. A sample of this size is usually sufficient for a normal
approximation [Han04]. Before each measurement, the ACE virtual machine is reverted to
a snapshot. The snapshot does not contain any of the emulator files that result from the
configuration. Most of the scripts create files and folders during the configuration process.
An initial presence of these files would affect the time it takes to configure the emulator.
Reverting to a snapshot eliminates the possibility of this effect.
4.6 System Parameters and Factors
Parameters that affect system performance include computing parameters and device
type. Computing parameters the research considers include memory, CPU speed, the
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programming language, and the operating system of the PC. The device type is the device
being evaluated: the real PLC or the ACE.
Computing Parameters. Various aspects of the computing environment can affect
the speed of the configuration tool and the response of the emulator. The CPU speed and
available memory have a direct impact on the time it takes for the configurator to run. The
programming language can affect the runtime of the configurator. The operating system
can also cause a certain amount of overhead. For this research, the configuration tool is
written in Python. For this experiment the workload generator and the ACE are on
separate Ubuntu 13.10 virtual machines with 20GB of disk space and 1GB of memory,
and an Intel Core i7-2760QM 2.4GHz processor.
Device Type. The device type parameter is the device being evaluated. The type is
either the real PLC or ACE. In this study, the PLC is a Koyo DirectLogic DL405 version
4.0.1.1735. The emulator consists of a script that is emulating the web server of the Koyo
PLC and additional files used to reference response behavior.
4.7 Experimental Setup
To run the experiment, a workload generator is connected to either the PLC or the
emulator. For this experiment the workload generator and the ACE run on separate
Ubuntu 13.10 VMWare virtual machines, each with 20GB of disk space, and 1GB of
memory. Both of these virtual machines are running on the same host with an Intel Core
i7-2760QM 2.4GHz processor. The PLC is a Koyo DirectLogic DL405 version
4.0.1.1735. The workload generator uses the program htmlget mt to generate and send
GET requests to the main page of the emulator and the PLC. While sending the workload,
the generator system is, also, running Wireshark to collect the traffic between the
workload generator and the device being evaluated. A pictorial description of this setup is
shown in Figure 4.4. All three machines are on the same isolated subnet. The machine
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running the virtual machines is connected to the PLC by a direct Ethernet connection.
Both of the virtual machines’ network adapters are set to the VMnet0 setting in VMWare.
Figure 4.4: Experimental Setup
4.8 Evaluation Technique
The technique for evaluating the configuration process is a direct measurement of the
configuration tool. The evaluation uses a Koyo DirectLogic 405 PLC [Koy13] as the
baseline for measurement. To measure the accuracy of the emulator, this research uses
measurement techniques from its preceding study [Jar13]. Because this research focuses
on emulating web protocols, accuracy is measured in terms of packet byte accuracy and
timing accuracy. The accuracy of the packets is based on the number of bytes that match
the bytes in packets sent by the baseline device. The timing accuracy consists of the time
that the emulator takes to respond after receiving a query. Using these measurements of
accuracy, this study sends queries to the baseline devices and the emulator, and compares
responses of each baseline with those from the emulator.
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The configuration process is evaluated on configuration time. There is no current
baseline for this metric. The configuration time is measured during 25 configuration
replications. The average of these times will set a baseline for the configuration time of an
ACE.
4.9 Experimental Design
The research has one system factor, with two levels, and one workload parameter with
two levels. Running 5 replications means that the research runs 40 tests. The packets sent
by the emulator should be 100% accurate in order to avoid the possibility of
fingerprinting. Due to the high number of repetitions allowed by this research, a 95%
confidence level for the difference in means is a goal for this study.
4.10 Methodology Summary
This research creates a tool for automatically configuring an device to emulate web
protocol behavior of a Koyo DirectLogic PLC. It does so by probing the programmable
logic controller (PLC) and analyzing traffic from the PLC communication, then saving
necessary information into a directory, which is discussed in Section 3.2. The emulator
uses that database to create a behavior profile for that particular PLC. The service that this
tool provides is the generation of an emulator that mimics known web protocols for a
PLC. How well the configuration tool performs, in creating the emulator, is based on the
accuracy of the responses, the time it takes to respond, and the time it takes for the
configuration process to complete.
To evaluate the automatically-configured emulator (ACE), it is initially tested against
an actual Koyo DirectLogic PLC. If the emulator can achieve accuracy that is within a
95% confidence level, with respect to the PLC, then the ACE would be considered
sufficiently accurate at evaluating the PLC.
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V. Results and Analysis
This chapter discusses the results from the measurements of the emulation
configuration tool (ECT). The ECT is analyzed based on the three metrics: response
accuracy, timing accuracy, and configuration time.
5.1 Response Accuracy
Measurements for response accuracy are taken across all 1000 trials, but there is no
change in response accuracy between trials. For both the PLC and the ACE, a total of
2444 bytes are sent during a response stream. These 2444 bytes are from the eight packets
sent in response to the GET request. The eight packets are shown in Figure 5.1. The first
packet is part of the TCP handshake. The second packet acknowledges the GET request
was received by the device. Packets three through six contain the HTML data from the
index.html web page. Packet seven is the HTTP OK message, telling the workload
generator that the request was successful. The final packet is part of the tear-down
sequence. The sum of the bytes in each packet make up the 2444 bytes in the response.
Figure 5.1: Eight Response Packet Types
Of the 2444 bytes, only 2310 are included in the analysis of the response accuracy.
The other 134 bytes are part of the non-deterministic bytes. Recall, that the
non-deterministic bytes have unpredictable values and are not included in the accuracy
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analysis. As shown in Table 5.1, for all 1000 trials at both the Slow and PLC Break
frequencies, 2259 out of 2310 deterministic bytes (97.79%) are correct. Because the byte
accuracy remains the same across all trials, there is no deviation and therefore no
confidence intervals.
Table 5.1: Response Accuracy of the ACE
Frequency Total Responses
Number of
Correct Bytes
Percent Correct
Slow 1000/1000 2259/2310 97.79%
PLC Break 981/1000 2259/2310 97.79%
The byte values of the PLC’s reponse packets serve as a baseline for evaluating the
accuracy of the ACE responses. A total of 51 bytes in the emulator’s response packets are
incorrect out of the 2310 bytes of the response. Table 5.2 shows all of the incorrect bytes,
and which packet types they appear in. For instance, bytes 0x07-0x0a appear incorrectly
in all eight packet types, while byte 0x47 is only incorrect in packet type three. Column
three shows the total incorrect bytes that each set accounts for.
Four incorrect bytes appear in all eight packet types. These are bytes 0x07, 0x08,
0x09, and 0x0a. This accounts for 32 incorrect bytes of the total 2310 bytes. These bytes
specify the middle four bytes of the six byte emulator media access control (MAC)
address. The first byte of the MAC address is correct for the ACE. The last byte is part of
the non-deterministic bytes, and not considered. Figure 5.2 shows the format of the
Ethernet II header [Cis12]. The highlighted section is the six byte source MAC address.
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Table 5.2: Incorrect Bytes in the ACE Response Packets
Byte(s) Description Packet Type Location Total Incorrect Bytes
0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a
MAC
Address
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 32
0x12, 0x13 IP ID 2,3,4,5,6,7,8 14
0x2f
TCP PSH
Flag
4,5 2
0x30, 0x31 Window Size 8 2
0x47
Letter c in
content-type
3 1
Figure 5.2: Format of the Ethernet II Header [Cis12]
Figure 5.3 shows the difference of the MAC address bytes in Wireshark. The first
three bytes of the MAC address make up the organizationally unique identifier (OUI),
which identifies the device vendor. The top section shows the Ethernet header of the PLC,
while the bottom section shows the ACE header. As shown in the source section of Figure
5.3, Wireshark identifies the PLC as a Host Engineering device. Host Engineering is the
vendor associated with Koyo PLCs. Because the MAC address of the ACE is not altered,
Wireshark still identifies it as a VMWare device. Changing at least the OUI bytes to match
those of the PLC would give the impression that the device is authentic.
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Figure 5.3: Difference in MAC Address Bytes
PLCs are commonly placed behind a router [BLK07]. This configuration could
potentially mask the MAC address of the emulator. In the future, if a situation were
identified that an attacker is able to get into the same subnet that the ACE honeypot is on,
adding functionality to change these bytes would be possible. It would require adding an
additional rule to the config emulator.sh file.
The second set of incorrect bytes are bytes 0x12 and 0x13. These are the IP
identification (IP ID) number of the packet. The IP ID is used to label datagrams.
Therefore, if the datagram is fragmented, each fragment will have the same IP ID. Then
the fragments can be reassembled [KuR13]. Figure 5.4 shows the formats of the IP and
TCP headers [Hus04]. The first highlighted section shows the IP ID field.
In all packets from the PLC, the IP ID is 0x0000. The IP ID of the first packet type
from the ACE is also 0x0000. After the first packet, though, the ACE sets the IP ID and
increments it by one for each subsequent packet type. The implementation of the IP ID is
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different across operating systems, so a deviation from the PLC is a potential area for
fingerprinting [Ark02].
Figure 5.4: Format of the IP and TCP Headers [Hus04]
The next byte difference is byte 0x2f, which is in packet types four and five. The 0x2f
byte is part of the eight bits that include the six TCP flags. The second highlighted section
of Figure 5.4 shows the location of the PSH flag. In the PLC responses, the value of 0x2f
byte is 0x18. The 0x2f byte in the ACE response has a value of 0x10. This difference
comes from the TCP PSH flag bit, which is set for the PLC, but not set for the ACE. The
PSH Flag bit, “indicates that the receiver should pass the data to the upper layer
immediately” [KuR13].
The next two incorrect bytes are 0x30 and 0x31. The location of these bytes are
displayed in the last higlighted field of Figure 5.4. These two bytes make up the TCP
window size (RFC 1323) [JBB92]. The bytes are only incorrect in packet type eight. For
the PLC the values are 0x07ff, or 2047 decimal. In the ACE the values are 0x0800, or
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2048 decimal. For all other packet types, the window size for both the PLC and the ACE,
is 2048 decimal. Both the PSH flag and window size are handled in kernel-space [Ste93].
Because the configuration process currently runs in user-space, changing this byte is out
of the scope of this study.
The last incorrect byte appears in packet type three. This is byte 0x47, which is the
letter c in the phrase content-type. This is a simple difference that arises from Python’s
httplib library. When forming the response dictionary, the ECT uses the HTTPConnection
object from httplib to send GET requests from the emulator and record responses. The
content-type section of the response header is parsed using the getheaders function of the
HTTPConnection response object. The return value of this function contains header
values as string objects. The httplib appears to disregard capitalization for the header
strings. The getheaders function is the method for discovering the value of the header
fields. The configuration process has no prior knowledge of whether or not the field values
are capitalized. If future research determines that the c is capitalized for all PLC brands,
then this can be hard-coded into the configuration process. Figure 5.5 shows the difference
between the PLC and the ACE for byte 0x47.
Figure 5.5: Comparison of content-type Phrase
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The RFC states that the field names of the HTTP headers are case-insensitive (RFC
2616) [Fie99]. In addition, the byte difference is syntactical rather than semantical, so the
difference is not critical. A skilled user may take note of the difference, but the change
would not likely throw a red flag.
In the Gumstix manually-configured emulator (MCE) research, the byte accuracy of
the emulator was 99.79% [Jar13]. An accuracy percentage, closer to that level, would have
further shown the validity of automatic configuration. Some of the incorrect bytes in the
ACE are the same incorrect bytes in the MCE. Specifically, this includes bytes 0x2f, 0x30,
and 0x31, which were incorrect in the same packet types as the MCE. Thus, the largest
cause for the deviation in the ACE accuracy percentage are the four MAC address bytes.
5.2 Timing Accuracy
Table 5.3 shows a summary of the response times for each device at the different
frequency levels. The mean response times across 1000 trials are shown, along with the
standard deviation and 95% confidence intervals for each. For the PLC Break level, two
summaries are shown for the PLC. The first shows the summary of all data collected. The
original data show that five outliers with p-values of less than 1x10−20 exist. Because the
outliers were so extreme, they were removed to more easily show the relationship between
the PLC and the ACE response times. The summary of that data is shown in the last line
of Table 5.3, labeled PLC (N.O.).
5.2.1 Slow.
The average response times from the Slow level, shows the behavior of each device at
a request frequency that both the PLC and the ACE can easily handle. From Table 5.3, the
average response time of ACE is 1.37 times faster than that of the PLC. Although the
difference is not huge, the 95% confidence intervals do not overlap. In addition, a
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Table 5.3: Summary of Device Response Times
Frequency Setting
Total
Responses
Mean Response
Time (s)
S.D. 95% C.I.
Slow
10 Req/sec
ACE 1000/1000 0.0295714 0.002653 0.0294-0.0297
PLC 1000/1000 0.0405504 0.001297 0.0405-0.0406
PLC Break
22.47 Req/sec
ACE 1000/1000 0.0381775 0.003843 0.0379-0.0384
PLC 989/1000 0.0562203 0.136387 0.0477-0.0647
PLC (N.O.) 984/1000 0.0509099 0.016059 0.0499-0.0519
two-sided t-test shows that the means are different with a p-value of 2.2x10−16. Thus, the
average response time of the ACE is statistically faster than that of the PLC.
Figure 5.6 shows a scatter plot of the response times from each trial. For visualization
purposes, the scatter plots in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 (discussed later) show the data
with first order outliers removed. It is easy to see that, at the Slow frequency, the response
times of the PLC are slower than those of the ACE.
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Figure 5.6: Device Response Times at the Slow Level.
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5.2.2 PLC Break.
This section discusses the performance of the devices at the PLC Break level. This is
the level at which the PLC just begins failing to respond to requests. Table 5.3 shows that,
again, the ACE responds faster than the PLC. On average, the ACE responds 1.47 times
faster than the PLC. In addition, a two-sided t-test for the means at the PLC Break level
also shows that the means are different with a p-value of 2.2x10−16. Figure 5.7 shows the
response times for each device with the first order outliers removed.
From these graphs, we can see that a number of outliers still exist for the PLC
response times. Because this frequency is the breaking point of the PLC, outliers are
likely to occur. The PLC only responded to 989 of the 1000 requests. This means that the
requests timed out for the other 11 attempts. It is reasonable to have variability in the
responses. Because all data points are valid, an analysis of all response times must be
included. Excluding the extreme outliers, though, allows for a more expressive view of the
means. The final line of Table 5.3 shows a summary of the PLC response times without
the outliers. The standard deviation is smaller, but it is still much larger than the standard
deviation of the ACE response times. Additionally, even though the average of the
no-outlier data is lower, the 95% CI still does not overlap that of the ACE response times.
Figure 5.8 shows another view of the response times. In this figure, the graph of the
ACE response times still shows the data with only the first order outliers removed. The
PLC graph, on the other hand, shows the data with all outliers removed that have a p-value
of less than 0.05. These graphs show that there is still a relatively larger spread amongst
the PLC data. It is now easier to see that even the fastest response times of the PLC are
still slower than those of the ACE.
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Figure 5.7: Device Response Times at the PLC Break Level
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Figure 5.8: Device Response Times at the PLC Break Level. All outliers for the PLC
response times have been removed.
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5.2.3 Adding an Artificial Delay.
The results above show that the response times of the ACE are faster than those of the
PLC. This difference could be lessened by adding an artificial delay to the ACE responses.
Pilot studies suggested that a delay of 1.5 ms could be suitable to lessen the gap between
the ACE and PLC response times. Initial considerations for maintaining autonomy and
minimizing complexity concluded that the static delay is potentially an acceptable
solution. Table 5.4 shows the response times of the ACE without the delay, alongside
those with an added 1.5 ms delay. The delay does help in decreasing the gap between
response times.
Table 5.4: Comparison of Response Times for the ACE With the Delay and Without the
Delay
Device
Request
Frequency
Response
(Seconds)
PLC
Average
Deviation from
PLC Average
Mean S.D.
ACE
Slow
0.029571
0.002653 0.040550
0.0110 1.37 x Faster
ACE
w/delay
0.031071 0.0095 1.31 x Faster
ACE
PLC Break
0.038178
0.003843 0.056220
0.0180 1.47 x Faster
ACE
w/delay
0.039678 0.0165 1.42 x Faster
A more accurate delay could be created by learning response time information during
the configuration process. Part of the configuration process includes sending GET requests
to each the PLC. Packets captured from this interaction with the PLC are analyzed. Using
this traffic configuration tool could determine the response times for each page request.
The average response times could be added to the ACE as an artificial delay. This could be
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a static delay, like the one used in this study. It could also be a varying delay withing a
range near the PLC average. Because the PLC response times have a large amount of
variance, adding a variable delay, would likely create more realistic response times.
5.2.4 Comparison to Gumtstix MCE Research.
This section provides comparative results of the Gumstix MCE experiments to those
of the ACE. Table 5.5 shows a summary of the averages from each study. The lines
labeled MCE PC are the results of the MCE running on an Ubuntu 2.6.35 PC [Jar13]. The
average PLC times from the MCE study are also from a Koyo DirectLogic PLC. Both the
ACE and MCE use Python’s web server library as the base for the emulator. It is
important to take into consideration the tests of the MCE and the ACE were run in
different testing environments. In addition, the PLC Break frequency that was derived for
the MCE research was 27.49 requests/second. The PLC Break frequency in this research
is 22.47 requests/second.
For the Slow frequency, the average response time of the MCE is 13.4 times faster
than its respective PLC average. The ACE is 1.3 times faster than the PLC average in this
research. The average MCE response time at the PLC Break frequency is 38.4 times faster
than the PLC average. The average time of the ACE is 1.4 times faster. In addition, the
standard deviation of the MCE response time is smaller than that of the ACE at both
frequency results.
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Table 5.5: Comparison of Response Times for the ACE and the Gumstix MCE [Jar13]
Device
Request
Frequency
Total
Responses
Response
(seconds)
PLC
Average
Deviation from
PLC Average
Mean S.D.
MCE
PC Slow
1000 0.002817 6.26e-4 0.037685 0.0349 13.4 x Faster
ACE 1000 0.031071 0.002653 0.040550 0.0095 1.3 x Faster
MCE
PC PLC Break
1000 0.002449 6.58e-4 0.093950 0.0915 38.4 x Faster
ACE 1000 0.039678 0.003843 0.0562203 0.0165 1.4 x Faster
5.3 Configuration Time
This research creates a standard configuration time for the ACE. This metric is not
compared to any baseline. Also note that the configuration time is calculated in only one
computing environment. Changes in processor speed and memory could greatly affect the
runtime. To determine an average, the ACE is configured 25 times. The total run time of
all configuration programs is recorded for each repetition. The average configuration time
for the ACE is 9.8 seconds with a standard deviation of 0.659 seconds. A histogram of the
configuration times is shown in Figure 5.9.
This study is 95% confident that the average configuration time is between 9.54 and
10.06 seconds. This confidence interval is under the five minute threshold value. An
average time of 9.8 seconds is acceptable for the intended implementations of the ECT.
This is, also, within reason for the amount of work accomplished by the tool.
5.4 Summary
This chapter presents the results of the ECT experiments. Testing of the response
accuracy shows that the ACE matches the PLC across 97.79% of the packets within the
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Figure 5.9: Histogram of the Configuration Time of the ACE Across 25 Replications
response. While this is less than 100%, it shows that a high level of accuracy can be
achieved, even with an automated process. Measurements of response time accuracy
shows deviations from the PLC average, but the response times are an improvement from
the previous MCE research. The configuration time executed in 9.8 seconds on average.
The low execution time shows that the configuration process does not require large
computing resources. Finally, the configuration time allows for expansion of options and
protocols configured by the ECT.
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VI. Conclusions
It has been shown that critical infrastructure is at risk for network attacks. Being able
to successfully mitigate these attacks requires knowledge about the vulnerability in ICS
systems and the methods that attackers use to gain access. It is possible to use real PLCs
to gain this knowledge, but PLCs are expensive. For instance, in an education
environment, students may deploy real attacks in order to learn about PLC vulnerabilities.
Using real PLCs for that environment could result in costly damage to the devices.
Hand-configured emulators are costly because they require the time of a skilled
programmer to configure the emulator to each desired PLC. Automatic emulators offer a
solution because they are inexpensive, and if they become damaged, they are easily
restarted. An emulator, that can be automatically configured, not only eliminates the need
for a programmer, but it also allows for a quick configuration of PLCs that look like any
brand or type.
This research created a process for automatically configuring a device to emulate the
web protocols of a PLC. The process gathers information about a PLC based on its
response behavior and network settings. It then uses a generic web server that combines
response headers and web page contents to form a response that is in line with the PLC.
The resulting emulator shows promising accuracy, suggesting that the process is valid, and
automatically configuring PLC emulators is possible.
Because the web interface can be the first view an attacker receives of a PLC, an
accurate emulation of the web protocols is critical in creating a useful tool. Furthermore,
the methods in this research can be expanded to include configuration of the industrial
protocols. This would create an even more effective emulator. More discussion of future
research is included in Section 6.2.
56
6.1 Research Conclusions
Response Accuracy. The response accuracy for this study is based on the number of
correct bytes in the response packets of the ACE. The accuracy in this study was 97.79%
across all tests. Because there is no variance, there are no confidence intervals for the
mean. One set of incorrect bytes, that greatly affected the accuracy percentage, were the
four bytes within the hardware address of the emulator. These bytes decreased the
accuracy by 1.4%. Correcting these bytes would bring the accuracy of the emulator closer
to the desired level. The presence of any incorrect bytes could be an area for
fingerprinting, so the accuracy of the ACE could still be improved. Despite the current
discrepancies, this study shows strong evidence, that it is possible to emulate the web
protocols of a PLC through an automated process.
Timing Accuracy. The second metric in the research is the timing accuracy of the
responses. The metric is determined by averaging the response times of the ACE for 1000
GET requests. The same requests are sent to the PLC, and the averages are compared. For
both the Slow and PLC Break frequencies, the ACE responds faster than the PLC. The
ACE responds 0.0095 seconds faster at the Slow frequency, and 0.0165 seconds faster at
the PLC Break frequency. If the ACE is connected to an industrial network, delays from
other networking devices could mask such a small difference.
Configuration Time. The configuration time metric is a measurement of the total
time to run the configuration process. The threshold for an acceptable time is based on the
intended implementations of the ACE. The implementations suggested by this study
include educational environments and industrial network deployment. Based on these
scenarios, a maximum configuration time of five minutes is considered acceptable.
Including the configuration time the ACE also provides a reference point for future
configuration processes. The results of this research show that the average configuration
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time is 9.8 seconds with a 95% confidence interval of 9.54-10.06 seconds. This confidence
interval is below the five minute threshold; therefore, it is considered acceptable.
6.2 Future Work
This section discusses recommendations for future research. Research opportunities
could mean expanding the functionality of the ACE, increasing its accuracy, or creating
more comprehensive methods of testing.
6.2.1 Adding Functionality.
Testing ECT on other PLCs. One aim of this research is to provide evidence that an
automatically configured emulator can behave like a PLC with minimal prior knowledge
of the PLC. The high level of accuracy of the ACE in this study shows that this is possible.
In addition, pilot studies were conducted using the ECT to configure the ACE for an
Allen-Bradley Logix5555. These studies suggest that an emulator of that device could be
created. Future research could use the ECT to create emulations of other brands of PLCs.
Testing the accuracy of those emulators would further confirm the validity of the ECT.
Multiple Emulators. Another avenue, for increasing functionality, is using the ECT
to create multiple emulators on a single device. Honeyd has shown the capability to do
this with other emulators [Hon12]. Therefore, it may be possible to incorporate the ECT
into Honeyd. Creating a network of virtual machines (VMs), each with their own ACE,
could be another option for investigation.
Emulation of Industrial Protocols. This research focused on emulating open web
protocols. To fully emulate a PLC, emulation of the PLC-specific protocols would need to
be included. The largest constraint of this research would be the proprietary nature of
many PLC protocols. One step in creating this emulation may be to devise an algorithm to
learn the protocol well enough that it can be emulated. At that point, the algorithm could
be added to the ECT. Creating a reverse engineering algorithm would not only aid in the
creation of an emulator, but could be used to find vulnerabilities in PLCs.
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6.2.2 Increasing Accuracy.
Many areas exist to make the ACE a more accurate emulation. One area is adding the
ability to make changes to values within the web interface. For the Koyo PLC, this
includes values such as the IP address of the PLC, the device name, and other settings.
The current state of the ACE allows a user to make changes, but those changes are not
properly updated across the entire web server. The Koyo propagates these changes
through scripting. A page that indicates that the change is successful appears on the
screen. Because this page only appears when a change has been submitted to a field, the
ECT does not see this page during configuration. When a change is submitted to the ACE,
it logs the change in a reference dictionary, but it does not display the completion page. It
does not properly route back to the index.html page, as the Koyo would. Future research
could create an algorithm for mimicking any scripting performed by the PLC. Because
each PLC changes values differently, this issue may not be as prominent for other brands.
6.2.3 Accuracy Testing.
The measurements of accuracy, for this research, is based only on the byte accuracy of
the response to the index.html page, and the timing of those responses. A more rigorous
testing method would allow researchers to see potential vectors for fingerprinting the
emulator. This would give researchers a list of faults that could potentially increase the
accuracy of the emulator. One option, for further accuracy testing, is putting the ACE on a
real network and allowing interaction with human users. This could be done with PLC
experts to see if they are able to detect the difference between the ACE and the real PLC.
Another option, would be to place the ACE on an Internet-facing network for outside
users to interact with. The users could give valuable input in determining the ACE’s
ability to deceive an attacker.
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Appendix A: Configuring the Emulator
The ECT has only been tested on an Ubuntu 13.10 virtual machine with 20GB of disk
space, and 1GB of memory. This setup should provide all necessary system requirements.
Any additional requirements are included in the generic emulator folder. These
requirements include the Python libraries used by the ECT, the configuration scripts, and
the generic web server.
To run the configuration process, open two terminals in the Ubuntu machine. In the
first terminal, run the following command within the generic emulator folder:
$sudo tcpdump -i eth0 -w settings.pcap
The tcpdump program captures the traffic between configuration machine and the
PLC. This traffic is saved to the settings.pcap file, which is parsed by the parse pcap.py
script. While tcpdump is running, start the configuration scripts. In the other terminal
window run this command:
$sudo python ./auto-wget.py
This command starts the auto-wget script. The auto-wget program also runs the
inputFinder script within the code. These scripts accomplish three tasks: (1) gather all
available pages from the web server, (2) send a GET request to each page, and (3) record
the PLC’s response to the GET request.
Stop tcpdump, and back in the second terminal where the auto-get command was
executed, run these commands:
$sudo python ./parse pcap.py settings.pcap
$cd web server
$sudo python ./webserver.py
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The parse pcap script looks through the settings.pcap file for a packet with the SYN
and ACK flags set. This packet contains the values for the PLC network configuration
options. parse pcap extracts these values and sends them the config emulator script. This
script changes the network configuration of the emulator VM, to match those values.
Finally the webserver.py command starts the ACE. The webserver.py program is a
Python based web server, with the functionality to reference other files in order to
formulate its responses to GET requests.
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Appendix B: Non-deterministic Fields
B.1 Non-deterministic Fields in Web Response
The information in this Appendix was created in the Gumstix MCE study [Jar13].
The Appendix is included in this paper for reference.
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Appendix C: Commands run by config emulator.sh
The following appendix lists the commands run by config emulator.sh that use values
from PLC traffic packets. The values are changed on the emulator virtual machine to
reflect the values that are on the PLC.
Setting Description Command
MTU
This is the maximum segment size (MSS)
plus 40 bytes for the TCP/IP header. The
MSS is the maximum amount of data that
can be put in a segment.
ifconfig mtu [value]
TCP Sack
TCP selective acknowledgment. This
allows the sender to specify whether
or not to tell the receiver which packets
have already been sent. Thus the
receiver can re-transmit lost packets.
[RFC 2018]
echo “[value]” >>/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp sack
TCP
Window
Scaling
This option allows windows larger than
65KB if it is turned on. [RFC 1323] echo “[value]” >>/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp window scaling
TCP
timestamp
This specifies whether or not to
calculate server uptime into the timestamp
value placed in the TCP options section. If
this option is turned on, it means “do
not use system uptime in calculation,”
otherwise use it. [RFC 1323]
echo “[value]” >>/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp timestamps
TTL
The number of hops allotted to a piece
of data. After the hops reach zero,
the data is discarded.
echo “[value]” >>/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip default ttl
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